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A m e r i c a n s ,  including many wearing uniforms, often tend to misperceive the
nature of war. They are inclined to oversimplify it into a rather mechanistic
process that considers "body counts" and the destruction of a given number of
objects as indicative of success. The true essence of war is, however, intellectual. As the
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz observed, war is an act intended "to compel our
enemy to do our wi l l " '  Thus, all warfare—to include Information Warfare2—is
essentially a contest of wills between the living. Yielding to the will of another is
fundamentally a cerebral process.
Information is the key to the mental interaction that underlies human conflict so
conceived. It provides the raw material by which the human mind calculates its interests
and decides whether or not to submit its will to its foe. As I will discuss, we in the West,
and particularly the United States, do not always do a very good job of correctly
perceiving what, in fact, a particular adversary considers to be his "interests", or even the
kind of information used in that analysis.
Still, it is clear that the ability to shape the information upon which an adversary
relies is an immense advantage in modern war. Correspondingly, controlling the
information that influences the calculations made by one's own side is equally important.
The type and accuracy of the data used, for example, to determine victory or defeat in a
given circumstance is obviously a critical element for leaders to know and appreciate.
Moreover, information provided to the public can be decisive as to the support a
military effort enjoys. If public support—particularly in liberal democracies—collapses,
the military operation will likely end in short order. In Clausewitzean terms3 this means
that information-and especially that which influences the all-important public,opinion-is
one of the centers of gravity4 in today's conflicts. Because of the importance of
information to both sides in a belligerency, one might fairly argue that all war is, in the
end, Information Warfare in some way.
Thus, in a very real sense the human target, that is, the collective mindset of the
adversary, is the most lucrative target in virtually all wars (excepting perhaps wars of
annihilation). Historically, U.S. and other Western militaries have sought to influence the
mindset of adversaries by, quite literally, eliminating their capability to physically resist5.
This usually required the actual destruction of the bulk of the enemy forces. For a variety
of reasons, this will seldom be feasible in the future: few governments (certainly among the
principal Western powers) could tolerate the enormous dedication of time and resources—
that not to mention casualties and the attendant political capital—that this approach
requires. Indeed, for potential foes of the United States, such a strategy is inconceivable in
the near-term, given America's current military prowess and considerable resources.
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Accordingly, for the foreseeable future, opponents of the United States will wage a
kind of "ritual war" in which combat engagements are as much or more important for
their symbolic value as they are for whatever actual effect they may have on a foe's
order-of-battle. Both sides in such conflicts will find that the real struggle will occur, not
on the battlefield per se, but in the minds of the combatants and those that support them.
In other words, there will be few future wars where an enemy is forced to yield because
his physical military capability has been fully exhausted; instead they wil l  be strategic
contests to win "hearts and minds".
Given the centrality o f  the information in such conflicts, i t  is imperative that
decision-makers understand the importance of observing the Law of  Armed Conflict
(LOAC)6 While one would hope this would be instinctive to both military and civilian
leaders, i t  is becoming ever-more apparent that the new realities of  late 20th century
politics are, in  any event, mandating adherence. The communications revolution is
increasingly providing the masses with real-time access to information from war zones.
Publics now—and to an even greater extent in the future—have the ability to easily
monitor the conduct of  their militaries, uncensored by government handlers through a
technology-empowered media. This information flow and the perceptions it can create
have real potential to significantly affect the ability of liberal democracies to wage war.
Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain.
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a
substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself
rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, i f  people believe that the
war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.7
I would contend, therefore, that LOAC has as much rationale in the Machiavellian ethic
of modern politics as it does as any classical construct of morals or virtue. Accordingly, I
believe it is in the interest of Information Warfare advocates to be conscious of what the
law does or does not permit if, for no other reason than the failure to be sensitive to these
concerns may well lead to operational failure.
The purpose of this essay is essentially set forth in the title. To be more specific, i t
will: 1) briefly examine the current state of the law as it applies to the use of Information
Warfare (LW) methodologies against the human target, and 2) try to forecast emerging
issues and trends. In so doing, it will touch on Information Operations (IC)) issues that
arise during periods of  putative peace, but will focus mainly on (IW)8 matters, that is,
"information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote
specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries."9
The Legal Regime
Perceived wisdom in some quarters holds that the whole subject of IW is so new that
no existing legal regime applies. This is simply incorrect. While it may be that there are
certain areas where the law needs development or clarification, a surprising amount of
existing law quite clearly does apply to IO. This is especially true with respect to the
human target.
Still, the legal architecture applicable to TO involving the human target is admittedly
complex. Some of the complicating elements include the fact that legality of a particular
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action may depend upon where on the temporal spectrum-of-conflict it is used, as well as
against exactly whom i t  is targeted. For example, a covert peacetime Information
Operation directed against non-state actors (e.g., terrorists or drug dealers) is subject to a
rather different body of  law than psychological operations (psyops)lo aimed against
lawful combatants in an international armed conflict.
The aforementioned phrase "international armed conflict" is itself of great import. As a
general rule, LOAC-like most international law-applies to relations between nations, not
individuals or other non-state actors. It does not ordinarily apply to situations such as law
enforcement operations (though the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as a matter of
policy wil l  usually apply it to all operations involving its personnel"). Parenthetically,
enthusiastic designations of a government effort as being a "war on drugs" or a "war on
terrorism", (some non-governmental entities even anoint themselves with appellations like
"soldiers" or "armies"), are not dispositive as to legal status under LOAC. The fact is that
LOAC does not usually control or limit operations against what, from a legal perspective,
are simply individuals or groups engaged in criminal enterprises.
Nevertheless, the indiscreet use of martial metaphors, combined with the employment
of military resources targeted at non-state actors, is a matter of some concern. When IO
advocates insist, for example, that they are engaged in an ongoing "cyberwar", i t  is not
inconceivable that some day the international community will take that rhetoric at face
value. This is not something with which we should necessarily take comfort. It is not, in my
view, in the interest of the United States or other developed nations to have the machinations
of non-state actors dignified as acts of combatants covered by LOAC. Among other things,
this may mean that the perpetrators of various crimes might be able to claim the immunity
afforded combatants under international law for acts committed in bellon
In any event, i t  would be a mistake to assume that IC conducted outside of  an
international armed conflict is free of legal limitation. To the contrary, in many instances
the legal limits are even greater because a myriad of international agreements—many
international telecommunications agreements aimed at facilitating the free f low o f
informationl 3—are applicable to the facilities information operators seek to employ.14 As
a general proposition, these international regulatory schemes are aimed at ensuring,
among other things, that international communication and other data transfers remain
free from harmful interference. The United States, along with other parties to these
agreements, have implemented domestic legislation requiring compliance with them, and
these laws often impose criminal penalties.15
Indeed, the most serious limitation on IO activities against human targets in
peacetime is, in the U.S. anyway, domestic law. A  range of Federal and state statutes
exist that, for example, criminalize various computer-intrusion acts,16 the very practices
that information operators may wish to employ. Except to the extent that some (but not
all) contain exceptions for surveillance activities by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, these laws apply to military personnel and other government personnel to the
same extent as anyone else. There is no blanket "national security" exception to the
criminal laws, as many seem to believe. Furthermore, authority to monitor information
systems does not necessarily include the power to manipulate or seize data within them,
absent compliance with applicable judicial prerequisites. In this regard it is important to
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recall that military personnel are generally prohibited from engaging in domestic law
enforcement activities via 10 or otherwise.17
In the United States, laws controlling covert actions 18 that is, any activity aimed "to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the U.S. wi l l  not be apparent or acknowledged publicly"19 are quite strict. Many
kinds of  IO aimed at the human target could fall within their purview. Of  particular
interest is the absolute prohibition on covert actions "intended to influence United States
political processes, public opinion, policies, or media."20
Covert action laws do not, however, l imit "traditional military activities" or ID
where the role of the U.S. is apparent or acknowledged. Public information and public
diplomacy programs are legal and may target audiences both here and abroad. It appears,
however, that many of these efforts are less than deft. In the aftermath of Kosovo, where
such operations appear to have had limited success, it is reported that the United States
has established a new organization intended to improve performance in this area.21
In this respect it may behoove military organizations to resist the trumphalism that
has marked too many public briefings in recent years. Consider, for example, the many
showings o f  precision-guided munitions slamming precisely into what are very
obviously purely mi l i tary targets. The net effect—and presumably unintended
consequence—of this carefully selected footage has been to feed public anticipations of
the unattainable "immaculate war." Once public expectations are raised, difficulties are
created when the "friction of war" causes unintentionally misdirected weapons.
Despite NATO's insistence that i t  achieved over 96% accuracy during operations
against Yugoslavia, i t  is instructive to note that repeated scenes of civilian casualties
paralleled a progressive drop in public support for the air campaign.22 Even more
problematic is the fact that the overselling of  technological capabilities creates a
perception of deliberateness when mistakes inevitably do occur. Consider that following
the attack on the Chinese Embassy the tenor of evening news reports on the national
television networks shifted drastically from 58% of  the stories having a favorable
character to 86% of them being negative in tone.23 Under these circumstances it should
not have been as much of a surprise as it was to many that at the end of the campaign a
majority of Americans did not consider the outcome a U.S. victory.2A
Efforts to educate the public as to the realities of  war are becoming ever more
important, since a smaller percentage of the population has served in the armed forces or
even knows anyone who has served in the military.25 Once the conflict begins, it may be
too late to succeed in this process, and even the attempt to do so may appear too self-
serving. Of course, this presumes that there is a bright-line definition of when war begins
in the Information Age.
Information Operations during Armed Conflict
Cyber-warriors frequently ask some permutation on the following query: "what is an
act of war in the Information Age?" Actually, the phrase "act of war" is outmoded. From
a legal perspective, there are only two bases to use armed force subsequent to the
ratification of the UN Charter that, in essence, outlawed war. The two situations still
authorizing the use of armed force are: 1) pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution;
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or 2) in self-defense in response to an "armed attack" pursuant to Article 51 o f  the
Charter. However, in the post-Kosovo era we may yet see the development of a third
basis, that being the humanitarian intervention rationale.26
Clearly, these concepts, and especially Article 51, are largely predicated on the
assumption that "armed attacks" and similar provocations will employ kinetic weapons.
The legal situation is less clear when the "attack" occurs digitally and consists merely of
the manipulation of data. Nevertheless, there appears to be a growing consensus among
international lawyers, at least insofar as computer network attacks are concerned. An
"armed attack" for the purposes of Article 51 is considered to have occurred when the
characteristics and effects of the cyber-strike equate to those that result from a traditional
kinetic weapon attack.27 Importantly, digital espionage via computer or similar means
does not, per se, violate international law, though it may breach domestic law of the
targeted nation. As Professor Gary Sharp has pointed out, however, such action might
under certain circumstances be interpreted as an expression of hostile intent so as to
provoke an anticipatory self-defense response.28
in any event, regardless of the particular manner in which an international conflict is
initiated, once it has begun, LOAC applies. As a general principle of international law
most agreements are suspended between belligerents, unless they are explicitly written to
remain in effect during wartime.29 Thus, it can be argued that many of the international
communications agreements previously discussed do not limit the information operator's
options in times of war. However, certain agreements to include, for example, the Hague
and Geneva Conventions,30 do, in fact, apply to the IO conducted against the human
target during periods of international armed conflict. Besides treaties, a fairly well-
developed body of customary international law31 applies to IO against the human target,
as it does to other means and methods of warfare.
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to enumerate all the many aspects of
LOAC, it is worth noting that, with respect to the human target, one of its most basic
principles is that the "rights of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited."32 There are other basic concepts that apply to the human target in IW, just as
they do to other targets in more conventional conflicts. These would include the
principles of discrimination and proportionality.
Discrimination requires the means or method of warfare to distinguish between
combatants and noncombatant persons and objects. This presents a real challenge to
cyber-warriors who wish to employ certain methods of computer attack, because LOAC
requires that these methods be capable of  discrimination.33 The principle o f
proportionality requires that the collateral damage to noncombatants or their property not
be disproportionate in relation to the "concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated."34 It is also important to understand that LOAC does not favor either side;
that is, the presumed "righteousness" of a side, even i f  patently obvious, nevertheless
does not allow it any greater freedom of action. Further, LOAC explicitly rejects an
"ends justifies the means" approach to warfare-called Kriegsraison in the law.35
In other words, even i f  a particular information operation targeting a human being
might bring a given conflict to an early termination, its execution is still forbidden if it is
violative of LOAC. The reason for this is obvious: were they not the case, war would
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quickly descend to a level of savagery that would not facilitate the restoration of peace,
which is one of  the fundamental purposes of  LOAC. The enmity that Kriegsraison
generates is not unlike that which fuels the seemingly endless cycle of ethnic violence
that we see around the world today.
LOAC anticipates developments in the means and methods of  warfare. Further,
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, like several earlier treaties, contains what is
called a "Martens Clause". This clause holds that in "cases not covered by this protocol or
by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience."36
The prohibition against attacks directed against civilian objects is an important
concept for information warriors to consider in constructing strategies against the human
target. Too often we see suggestions in the literature—or even press reports—about
computer network attacks aimed, for example, against the personal bank accounts o f
adversary leaders.37 Absent a showing that such monies are being directly used to
support a military effort, i t  would seem that such a tactic could not be reconciled with
LOAC. Additionally, some experts believe that such attacks would invite retaliation to
which the U.S. is vulnerable, and thus expose the attackers to legal liability i f  third-party
banks are stmck.38
A more complex problem is presented by the use of TO techniques such as a computer
network attack against dual-use infrastructure targets. Because many of these facilities use
computer-driven controls, they are often touted by information warriors as especially
lucrative opportunities to substitute digital attack for a conventional military strike.39
However, in many cases both military forces and civilian society rely upon the same power
grid, communications network, transportation links, and fuel supply system. Modern
societies, especially in the urbanized setting, are extremely vulnerable to such infrastructure
loss. For example, destroying the power grid may well deny military facilities with
necessary power, but at the same time leave the noncombatant civilian population without
water, sewerage, heat, transportation and other systems essential for life.
In order to attack such targets consistent with LOAC, a proportionality analysis must
be accomplished. I t  is, of  course, not impermissible to conduct infrastructure attacks i f
there is a sufficiently overarching military objective, and the expected collateral damage is
incidental. However, simply because few, i f  any, immediate casualties may result,40 that
does not mean the significant secondary or reverberating affects upon the noncombatant
population can be overlooked.41 Still, as indicated above, such attacks are permissible
where the military advantage sought outweighs the expected collateral effects upon
noncombatants (inclusive of the reasonably foreseeable reverberating effects).
A troubling precedent with respect to infrastructure attacks appears to be emerging
in the aftermath of Kosovo. According to a 25 May 1999 report in The Washington Post,
NATO officially insisted that attacks on the power grid were intended to disrupt the
Yugoslav military, but "senior allied military officials acknowledged that they also
wanted to damage the quality o f  everyday life so that suffering citizens wi l l  start
questioning the intransigence of their political leadership."42 It appears that this strategy
worked. Thomas L. Friedman wrote in the New York Times that:
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As the Pentagon will tell you, airpower alone brought this war to a close in
78 days for one reason-not because NATO made life impossible for Serb
troops in Kosovo (look how much armor they drove out o f  there), but
because NATO made life miserable for the Serb civilians in Belgrade.43
Following the conflict, Airman Magazine, an official publication o f  the U.S. A i r
Force, published the following comments from the senior Air Force commander during
the campaign:
"As an airman, I  would have targeted the power grid, bridges and military
headquarters in and around Belgrade the first day of  the conflict," said [the
commander], who believes that's what eventually brought Milosevic to his
knees. "Air power is made for shock value."
"Just think i f  after the first day, the Serbian people had awakened and their
refrigerators weren't running, there was no water in their kitchens or bathrooms,
no lights, no transportation system to get to work, and five or six military
headquarters in Belgrade had disappeared, they would have asked: Al l  this after
the first night? What is the rest of this [conflict] going to be like?"44
Destroying infrastructure—whether by conventional bombing or via digital attack—
in order to deny noncombatants an indispensable necessity of  life like water, to leave
them with spoiled food in a wartime economy, and to deny them transportation without
regard to the nature of  their work, is not the kind of  attack that is, in my opinion,
permissible under LOAC.45 Although the actual attacks conducted during the Yugoslav
operation appear justified as bona fide efforts to reduce the effectiveness o f  military
facilities and military equipment and communications, a number of groups condemned
the NATO bombing campaign.46 I f  the purpose was that hypothesized in the Airman
Magazine, then the critics' complaints could have substance.
In short, when the human target is a noncombatant, then attacks for the sole purpose
of eroding their life support system are impermissible, regardless of  the methodology
employed. This is not to say, however, that noncombatants cannot be inconvenienced or
denied the luxuries. However, as Yves Sandoz of the International Committee of the Red
Cross observes, defining the "military advantage when the aim of  the operation is to
weaken the enemy so as to make him surrender" is extremely problematic.47
Apart from the legal and moral issues generated by infrastructure attacks, consider a
1994 study by the U.S. A i r  Force's School for Advanced Aerospace Studies entitled
"Strategic Attack of  National Electrical Systems".48 After reviewing WW II, Korea,
Vietnam, and especially the Gulf War, the study concludes that: "To strike electric power
to affect civilian morale, increase costs to leadership, or impact the military wil l  waste
missions and could prove counterproductive to the political aims of the war..."49
The study goes on to say with respect to Iraq, where damage to the electrical grid
was blamed for thousands of noncombatant deaths, that "the practical fact is the negative
impact of these attacks on world opinion far outweighed the military benefits accrued by
bombing electrical power in Iraq. The implication is clear—national electrical systems
are not a viable target."50 Thus, cyber-warriors should consider that attacks against dual-
use infrastructure might undermine the public support that Clausewitz tells us is part of
the "remarkable trinity" of war.
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Computer network attack is not the only or even necessarily the most effective
means of  IW against the human target. Psychological Operations present real
opportunities for the information operator, as there are relatively few legal limitations.
One example of an unlawful psyop would be "to broadcast a false report of cease-fire or
armistice", which in LOAC terms is impermissible perfidy.51 That said, it is not—despite
what many people think—violative of LOAC to use lies or disinformation that do not
amount to perfidy. Nevertheless, as a matter of DoD policy, "fdleception operations will
not intentionally target or mislead the US public, the US Congress, or the US media."52
Sidney Axinn, however, argues in his book A Moral Military:
[What is] the morality of psychological warfare? When it is an effort to use
the truth to gain a military goal, this type of warfare is to be accepted and
applauded. When lying or "disinformation" is used, it cannot be accepted as
an honorable weapon. (Of course, this is quite apart from legitimate tactics
to conceal information from an enemy or to mystify or fool an enemy.)53
In any event, some experts insist that there "is no need to lie because properly
packaged, the truth is the very best propaganda."54 Nonetheless, because technology now
permits the digital manipulation of photographs and film to create extraordinarily
convincing but false images,55 information warriors see unique opportunities to assail the
human target, especially enemy leaders.56 Thomas Czerwinsld, then a professor in the
School of Information Warfare and Strategy at the National Defense University, asks:
"What would happen i f  you took Saddam Hussein's image, altered it, and projected it
back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party7"57 Quite obviously,
they could deceive a population about its leaders, as Professor Czerwinski indicates.
While propaganda of this sophistication may be new, the idea of using psyops to
undermine an adversary's leaders is not. But this norm may need re-examination when
the government affected is a democratic one. A key component of U.S. national security
policy is the promotion of democracy.58 While no one would dispute that the improper
actions of the leaders of any adversary state-including those of democracies-must be
stemmed, it is something altogether different to hold that it is an appropriate strategy to
attempt to change democratically-elected leadership via the dissemination of
manipulated information.
Furthermore, Michael Walzer asserts that "war aims legitimately reach to the
destruction or defeat, demobilization, and (partial) disarming of the aggressor's armed
forces. Except in extreme cases, like that of Nazi Germany, they don't legitimately reach to
the transformation of  the internal politics of the aggressor state or the replacement of  its
regime."59 Surely, a democratic government is not the kind of extreme case that Walzer
exempts. Thus, for policy reasons beyond any short-term gain, it may be prudent to restrain
information warriors from engaging in tactics that damage the democratic process.
With respect to non-democratic governments, psyops aimed at undermining them
are not necessarily unlawful, even if it is reasonably expected that civilian casualties may
result. For example, it has long been permissible under LOAC to attempt to induce a
civil insurrection in an adversary nation 60 despite experience that shows that civil wars
can have horrific effects on civilian populations. The key here is that the appalling nature
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of modern civil wars is much the result of excesses committed by security forces. LOAC
does not, itself, impose legal obligations upon the propagator of the psyop for crimes the
security forces may commit.
The real limitation on the effectiveness of psyops is not so much the law, but the fact
that Americans too often do not properly evaluate the human target. Edward L. Rowney,
a former U.S. arms control negotiator and retired Army general comments:
Our biggest mistakes stem from the assumption that others are like us,
when in fact, they are more unlike than like us. We insist on ascribing to
others our cultural traits, not recognizing that we have different objectives
due to our unique historic backgrounds and sets of values. In short, "We
fail to place ourselves in the other person's moccasins."61
It is ironic that the nation that invented modern "Madison Avenue" methods of
persuasion appears to struggle to develop effective cross-cultural psyops. According to
one report, for example, psyops in the U.S.-led Yugoslav campaign were "boring and
badly done-it [was] miserable."62 One way of improving psyops attacks against the
human target may be to relax legal requirements that talented information specialists
must meet in order to become part of the armed forces. It may be wise to allow persons-
the disabled and others-who have the psyops skills but who presently cannot do so join
the armed forces or create a special reserve unit to accommodate them.63
An important part of psyops is denying the adversary the opportunity to conduct the
kind of information campaigns that sustain the support of the people. As a general rule,
journalists—even those attached to military units—are treated under LOAC as
civillans,64 so long as they do not do act inconsistent with that status, such as taking part
in hostilities.65 In the Kosovo conflict, Serbian broadcast radio and television outlets
were bombed in an action criticized by a number of international lawyers66 and
organizations.67 However, in this case the facilities were used to whip up ethnic hatreds
for years.68 As  NATO spokesman, Air Commodore David Wilby, declared on April 8,
1999: "Serb radio and TV is an instrument of propaganda and repression...It is...a
legitimate target in this campaign."69 Indeed, incitement to genocide may itself be a war
crime.70 Under these circumstances I  believe that propaganda outlets are legitimate
targets for attack, provided the appropriate proportionality analysis sustains i t . '
A rather more complex problem is raised by the dramatic growth in the capabilities of
the media to report from war zones. Globalized news sources now have the technical means
to rapidly gather and disseminate information about military operations virtually without
support or censorship of governmental authorities. Moreover, commercial satellites-many of
which are owned by third parties-are providing high-resolution images heretofore the
exclusive province of the intelligence agencies of the developed nations.72 Another
information source, the Internet, is now being described as a "simple, low-cost, non-
threatening and relatively risk-free" way of collecting data.
In short, the media and commercial information sources are becoming the "poor
man's intelligence service", with the capability to provide information of great value to
adversaries. Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that much of this near-
instantaneous information can complicate the political equation for democratic leaders.
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The sheer speed with which it is conveyed gets inside the "decision loop" by presenting
publics with raw data before leaders can prepare them to understand it in the context of
an ongoing military operation.
As suggested above, it appears that i f  the military value of the information being
transmitted to the enemy is sufficiently important, and the IW means employed to disrupt
or corrupt that flow otherwise complies with LOAC principles—to include the concept
of proportionality—it would seem permissible to conduct the operation. It may, however,
be politically infeasible to do so if the operation raises the specter of confrontation with a
media outlet from a non-belligerent third party not currently involved in the conflict.73
But what if the purpose of the operation is to disrupt the flow to a friendly "human
target," our own public?74 For example, in a report on the attacks on Serb television
stations, Patrick L. Sloyan pointed out that while bombing stopped the "diet of lies fed
Serb viewers," i t  also would "curb transmission to the West of those disturbing
'collateral damage' pictures that could erode public support for NATO's escalating
strikes in the Balkans."75 If the latter were the sole aim, would the attacks be justified?
Probably not.
Censorship and exclusion of the press from military operations has long been
tolerated in liberal democracies during wartime.76 Essentially, where there is a
demonstration that the information would present a clear and present danger to national
security, it could be suppressed.77 That concept, however, would not seem to permit the
suppression of news reports via IW or other means, simply because the information
conveyed would tend to demoralize public opinion.
Concluding Observations
This paper has sought to present an outline of the law as it relates to the human
target in information warfare. Basically, IW should be considered and evaluated in much
the same way as any other methods or means of warfare. In most instances, the
application of LOAC is relatively straightforward and should not present the operator
with significant difficulty.
Perhaps the most challenging of the emerging issues relates not so much to the fact
that the technology may be new or has not heretofore been put to military uses, but to the
fact that such developments have marked the history of warfare for eons. Rather, i t
relates to the increasing tendency of military commanders to attempt to directly shape
public opinion in both adversary countries, as well as domestically. This represents a
departure from the practice in the U.S. and many Western countries to leave such
concerns largely to the civilian leadership. Still, to the extent this effort is based on a
timely and well-conceived presentation of accurate facts, it cannot be criticized and may
well serve to enhance the effectiveness of military operations.
However, where IW techniques are sought to manipulate or deny information, we
must be concerned about the legitimacy of the effort. Modern communications
technology makes it virtually impossible to segregate messages sent to adversary societies
from that consumed by friendly publics. In addition, i f  IW techniques—and especially
computer—network attack methodologies-are used to achieve ends against the human target
that are impermissible if accomplished via kinetic weapons, they must be rejected.
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Where the human target in IW is a noncombatant civilian, his person and property is
entitled to protection under LOAC, and it is our duty to secure such persons and objects
from attack. I t  is imperative that the lure of IW not result in a reemergence of
Kriegsraison—like "we-had-to-burn-the-village-to-save-it" syndrome. Should that occur,
we forfeit the very ideals for which we stake-as those who went before us did-"our
Lives, our Fortunes, and sacred Honor."78
Endnotes
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (ed., and trans. 1976) (1832), p.
75.
2 There are many possible definitions of Information Warfare, but a common official definition is
that used by the Air  Force, that is, "any action to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy's
information and its functions while protecting Air Force assets against those actions and exploiting
its own military operations." See Captain Robert G. Hanseman, USAF, The Realities and
Legalities of Information Warfare, 42 A.F. L. Rev. 173, 176 (1997) citing USAF Fact Sheet 95-20
(Nov. 1995). See also note 8 supra and accompanying text.
3 Clausewitz held that war is a "remarkable trinity" composed of the people, the military, and the
government. See Clausewitz, supra note 1, p. 89.
4 Centers of gravity are "Whose characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which military
forces derive freedom of  action, physical strength, or will to fight." See Chairman of  the Joint
Chiefs o f  Staff, Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 1-02, DoD Dictionary o f  Military and Associated
Terms, 23 March 1994, as amended 29 June 1999.
5 See generally, Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War : A History of United States Military
Strategy and Policy (1978) (discussing the strategy of annihilation that has marked U.S. wars).
6 LOAC might be described as follows:
7 W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws of War xxiv (1994) (emphasis added).
8 The Joint Chiefs o f  Staff define Information Warfare as lajct ions taken to affect adversary
information and information systems while defending one's own." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13 (9 October 1998), p. GL-7.
LOAC is a body of  law that derives from several international treaties
(specifically, the Hague and Geneva Conventions), as well as customary
international law (law created by the custom and practice of  civilized
warring states, which is binding on all nations). I t  applies to all armed
conflicts between states (thus, civil wars or battles with terrorist groups are
not covered.) Hague Law is concerned mainly with the means and methods
of warfare, while Geneva Law is concerned with protecting persons
involved in conflicts, such as POWs, the wounded, and civilians.
Hanseman, supra note 2, p. 189.
9 Joint Pub 3-13, supra note 8, p.GL-7. See also note 2 supra.
10 Psychological operations are defined as II:Tanned operations to convey selected information
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of
psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes or behaviors favorable to the
originator's objectives." See Joint Pub 3-13, supra note 8, p. GL-10. Ideally, a psychological
operation "reduces the morale in combat efficiency of the enemy troops and creates dissidence and
dissatisfaction within their ranks. Psychological operations can promote resistance within a civilian
populace against a hostile regime or to enhance the image of a legitimate government. The ultimate
148 C y b e r w a r  3.0: Human Factors in information Operations and Future Conflict
objective of American psyops is to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to
take action favorable to the U.S. and it's allies." Colonel Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, and Colonel
Daniel W. USAF, Retired, "Psychological Operations: An  Introduction" in Psychological
Operations: Principles and Case Studies (Air University Press, Colonel Frank L. Goldstein, ed.,
1996), p. 5.
11 Department of Defense Directive 5100.7, DOD Law of War Program, July 10, 1979.
12 Noel C. Koch, a former senior DOD official, argues that i t  would be "grotesque to afford
terrorist the rights that belong to legitimate combatants under the laws of war." See: LtCol Richard
J. Erickson, USAF, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored International
Terrorism (Air University Press, July 1989), p. 64 (Erickson, himself, however, argues that as
unlawful combatants, terrorists are not afforded the rights of legitimate combatants. That view,
however, is contingent upon particular facts and circumstances.)
13 See e.g., The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization Agreement
(INTELSAD, 20 August 1971. For a discussion of the legal aspects of Information Warfare in the
context of dual-use satellite communications systems see: Robert A. Ramey, Space Warfare and
the Future Law of War, July 1999 (unpublished thesis submitted to McGill University, Canada),
pp. 165-171.
14 For example, the UN Convention on the Law of  the Sea may prohibit unauthorized psyop
broadcasts from sea-based platforms. See Joint Pub 3-13, supra note 8, p. 1-13.
15 For example, 47 U.S.C. 13 502 criminalizes the knowing and willful violations o f  "any rule,
regulation, restriction, or  condition made or imposed by any international radio or  wire
communications treaty or convention."
16 See e.g., The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and the Computer Abuse Amendments of
1994, 18 U.S.C. 131030 et seq. For a bibliography of Federal statutory and regulatory guidance, see:
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Inforination Wad-are: Legal, Regulatory, Policy
and Organizational Considerations for Assurance (2d Ed. 4 July 1996). For a recent discussion of the
applicability of the criminal law to Information Warfare, see: Major David J. DiCenso, USAF (Ret.),
"IW Cyberlaw: The Legal Issues of Information Warfare",Airpower Journal, Summer 1999.
17 The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 131385) forbids the use of the military to "execute the
laws."
18 See generally 50 U.S.C. 13413, et seq.
19 50 U.S.C. 13413b(e).
2050 U.S.C. 13413b(f).
21 Ben Barber, "Group Wil l  Battle Propaganda Abroad", Washington Times, July 28, 1999.
(Discussing the newly established International Public Information Group designed "to enhance
U.S. security, bolster America's economic prosperity and to promote democracy abroad").
22 By 25 May 25 1999, CNN was reporting that 82% of Americans favored a suspension of the
airstrikes. See Keating Holland, "Americans Want Temporary Halt to Airstrikes", May 25. In the
same poll, the percentage of Americans favoring U.S. participation in the airstrikes fell from 61%
on 15 April to 49%. For details of the earlier poll see Keating Holland, Support for NATO strikes,
and ground troops growing, April 15, 1999.
23 "Inside TV", USA Today, June 10, 1999, at 3D (citing a study by the Center for Media and
Public Affairs).
24 A poll of Americans revealed an "absence of any of the euphoria that followed the end of the Gulf
War" and that "not even half-48 percent-believed the United States and its allies won the war". See:
Richard Morin, "Americans Back Ground Troops", The Washington Post, June 16, 1999, p. 32.
25 For a discussion of the implications of the reported "gap" between military and civilian societies
occasioned by the declining percentage of the population with military services, see: Thomas E.
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. 1 4 9
Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society", Atlantic Monthly (July 1997), p.
66. A major study is underway by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies to examine this thesis.
26 Some international lawyers contend, however, that humanitarian intervention is not justified and
that the action in Kosovo constituted aggression in the absence of explicit UN sanction. See:
Walter J. Rockier, "War Crimes Law Applies to the U.S. Too", Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1999.
See also: D.G. Kousoulas, "The Day After", The Washington Post, June 8, 1999, p. 19.
27 See e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, "Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework", 37 Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law 885
(1999) and Walter Gary Sharp, Jr., CyberSpace and the Use of Force (1999).
28 Sharp, supra note 27, p. 132.
29 See Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal
Issues in Information Operations, May 1999, p. 4. [Hereinafter "Assessment"].
30 These include, the Hague Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 18 October
1907; the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of  War on Land and
Annex Thereto Embodying Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs o f  War on Land, 18
October 1907; the Hague Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in  Case o f  War on Land, 18 October 1907; the Geneva Convention for  the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August
1949; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949; the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; and the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War, 12 August 1949. See Department of the Army Pamphlet
27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare (7 December 1956).
31 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg described "customary" international law in
the context of LOAC as follows:
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but also in the customs
and practices of states, which gradually obtained universal recognition, and
from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by
military courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows
the needs of a changing world.
As cited in Reisman and Antoniou, supra note p. xix.
32 Article 22, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague
Convention IV, October 18, 1907.
33 See generally: Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour E. Goodman, and Kevin J. Soo Boo, Information
Warfare and International Law (1998), pp. 30-35, and Mark Russell Shulman, Legal Constraints on
Information Warfare, Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for Strategic and Technology, Air War College,
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL (March 1999), pp. 11-18.
34 The concept of proportionality was codified in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, arts. 51.5(b) and 57.2(iii). [Hereinafter "Additional Protocol I"]. While the
U.S. has not ratified Additional Protocol 1, this portion is considered part o f  customary
international law.
35 Kriegsraison is the 19th century German doctrine that asserted that military necessity could
justify any measure—even violations of  the law of  war. See Department of the A i r  Force,
Pamphlet 110-31, International Law-The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (19
November 1976), paragraph 1-3a(1).
36 Article 1 (2), Additional Protocol I, supra note 34.
37 See e.g., Gregory L. Vistica, "Cyberwar and Sabotage", Newsweek, May 31, 1999, p. 38 (alleging a
150 C y b e r w a r  3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict
CIA cyberwar against Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's bank accounts). See also: Douglas
Waller, "Onward Cyber Soldiers", Time, August 21, 1995, p. 38 (reporting about an Army officer who
discussed "electronically zero[ing] out" and enemy leader's bank account in a future war).
38 See Bob Sullivan, "Cyberwar? The U.S. Stands to Lose", MSNBC, June 3, 1999.
39 See Waller, supra note 37 (reporting about an Army officer who contended that he could win a
war "almost bloodlessly" at a computer terminal. He visualized the foe's phone system brought
down by a computer virus, logic bombs ravaging the transportation network, false orders confusing
the adversary's military, the opponent's television broadcasts jammed with propaganda messages,
and the enemy leader's bank account electronically zeroed out).
40 See Winn Schwartau, "The Ethics of Civil Defense and Information Warfare", Journal of  the
National Computer Security Association (NCSA News), June 1997, pp. 15-17.
41 See: Commander James W. Crawford, "The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting
of National Electrical Power Systems", 21 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 101 (Summer/Fall
1997) (discussing secondary and reverberating effects).
42 Phil ip Bennett and Steve Coll, "NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid", Washington
Post, May 25, 1999, p. 1.
43 Thomas L. Friedman, "Was Kosovo World War BP", New York Times, July 2, 1999.
44 As quoted by MSgt Tim Barela in "To Win a War", Airman Magazine, September 1999, pp. 2-3.
These are essentially the same points reported earlier by the The Washington Post, See William
Drozdiak, "Air War Commander Says Kosovo Victory Near", Washington Post, May 24, 1999, p. 1.
45 Article 54, Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, makes it prohibited "to attack, destroy, remove or
render useless objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population" for "any motive."
46 Fred Hiatt, "NATO's Good Fight", The Washington Post, July 11, 1999, p. B7.
47 Yves Sandoz, "Beware, The Geneva Conventions Are Under Fire", International Herald
Tribune, July 14, 1999.
48 Major Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., USAF, Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems, U.S. A i r
Force's School for Advanced Aerospace Studies, Air  University, Maxwell A i r  Force Base, A L
(October 1994).
49 Supra note 48, p. 53.
5° Ibid.
51 Assessment, supra note 29, p. 7.
52 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception (31 May
1996), p. 1-4.
53 See Sidney Minn, A Moral Military (1989). pp.159-160
54 Colonel Fred W. Walker, USAF (Ret.), "Strategic Concepts for Psychological Operations", in
Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies, supra note 10, pp. 17, 24.
55 See Dennis Brack, "Do Photos Lie?", Proceedings, August 1996, p. 47.
56 The author has previously discussed this theme. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Technology:
Recomplicating Moral Life for the Nation's Defenders", Parameters, Autumn 1999, pp. 24, 37-38.
57 As quoted by Peter Grier, "Information Warfare", Air Force Magazine, March 1995, p. 35.
58 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century 19 (May 1997).
59 Michael Walker, Just and Unjust Wars xvii (2d ed., 1992) (emphasis added).
60 See Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (July 1956), para
49, p. 22. See also, Greenberg, Goodman, and Soo Hoo, supra note 33, p. 35.
61 Edward L. Rowney, "Tough Times, Tougher Talk", American Legion Magazine, May 1997, PP.
24-26.
62 Carlotta Gall, "NATO TV Is Sent To Serbs, Who Are Harsh Critics", New York Times, May 26,
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. 1 5 1
1999. Cf. Steven Collins, "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints", Parameters,
Summer 1999, p. 57 (discussing the mixed record of PSYOP in Bosnia).
63 The author discussed the benefits and perils o f  such a proposal in  a paper entit led
"Organizational Change and the New Technologies of  War", presented at the Joint Services
Conference on Professional Ethics, Washington, DC (January 1998).
64 Articles 79, Additional Protocol 1, supra note 34.
65 See Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (1993), p. 233.
66 Rockier, supra note 26.
67 See William M. Arkin, "Changing the Channel in Belgrade", The Washington Post, May 25,
1990, (citing the Committee to Protect Journalists and Human Rights Watch).
68 See e.g., Jamie F. Metzl, "Information Intervention", Foreign Affairs, November/December
1997, p. 15.
69 See Arkin, supra note 67.
70 See Greenberg, Goodman, and Soo Hoo, supra note 33, p. 36, n.96 and accompanying text.
71 According to the DoD General Counsel, "[w]hen it is determined that civilian media broadcasts
are directly interfering with the accomplishment of the military forcels mission, there is no law of
war objection to using minimum force to shut it down." See Assessment, supra note 29, p. 9.
72 See William J. Broad, "Private Ventures Hope for Profits on Spy Satellites", New York Times,
February 10, 1997, p. 1.
73 Compare Frederick W. Kagan, "Star Wars in  Real Life: Political Limitations on Space
Warfare", Parameters, Autumn 1998, p. 112.
74 With respect to adversary news outlets, the DoD General Counsel states that the "extent to
which force can be used for purely psychological operations purposes, such as shutting down a
civilian radio station for the sole purpose of undermining the morale of the civilian population, is
an issue that has yet to be addressed authoritatively by the international community." See
Assessment, supra note 29, p. 9.
75 Patrick L. Sloyan, "The Fog of War", American Journalism Review, June 1999.
76 See generally, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., "Excluding the Press form Military Operations", in
National Security Law (John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, and Robert F. Turner, eds.,
1990), p. 993.
77 See generally, Donald L. Robinson, "National Security" in The Oxford Companion to the
Supreme Court (1992) p. 574.
78 The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
The views expressed in this article are those of  the author and do not reflect the policies or
positions of the US Government, the Department of Defense, or the US Air Force.
